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I. INTRODUCTION
A recognition of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 reminds us of the evolving, rather than static, nature of societal racism.
One group of problems that is lately of increasing salience focuses on the proper
legal response to what may be thought of as racist speech. Putatively racist speech
has become the subject of potential litigation in a variety of contexts, including
the workplace, 2 ordinary commercial transactions, 3 public policy debate, 4 the
public schools, and the college campus. 6 However it is defined, racist speech
takes a number of forms. It imposes or threatens a number of harms. As a result,
a variety of legal strategies has been devised to address the problems of racist
speech. The consistency of such solutions with the Constitution's free speech
*Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(h)(6) (1982)).
2. See, e.g., Gaiters v. Lynn, 831 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1987); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.
I11. 1984) (discussing no free speech issues); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 141 (1979) (en bane); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88
(1970) (en banc); Lay v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 379 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam);
Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (en banc).
3. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981); Sambo's
of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Irving v. J. L. Marsh, Inc., 46 111.
App. 3d 162, 360 N.E.2d 983 (1977); Bradshaw v. Swagerty, 1 Kan. App. 2d 213, 563 P.2d 511 (1977);
Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 346 Pa. Super. 357, 499 A.2d 648 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 638
P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981); Regina v. Britton, [19671 1 All E.R. 486 (C.A. 1966); Glimmerveen and Hagen-
beek v. Netherlands, 4 E.H.R.R. 260 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1979).
5. See, e.g., Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 399 A.2d 225, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838
(1979); Clarke v. Board of Educ., 212 Neb. 250, 338 N.W.2d 272 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 135 n.12 (1982); Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression
at Yale, 4 HUM. RTS. 357 (1975). For a report on the current spate of racist incidents on predominantly
white college campuses, many of which feature a speech component, see, e.g., Kantrowitz, Blacks Protest
Campus Racism, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1987, at 30.
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clause is, however, controversial; 7 and this issue is central to the discussion
that follows.
Initially, several legal strategies appear to have promise in deterring, punish-
ing, or obtaining compensation for racist speech. Depending partly upon con-
text, one might look to the torts of group defamation 8 or intentional infliction
of emotional distress, 9 or to civil10 or criminal11 anti-discrimination statutes,
while making appropriate use of the "fighting words" doctrine developed by
the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 12 This Article surveys
these legal strategies and discusses the constitutional free speech and other le-
gal constraints on the use of these strategies, as well as the likely practical costs
and disadvantages associated with their use. The Article then proposes some
elements of a theory of restrictions on racist speech consistent with the require-
ments of the first amendment. This theory seeks to take into account the partic-
ular features of the predominant strains of contemporary racism as it is currently
practiced and seeks also to give appropriate theoretical weight to the society's
recognition of the sheer moral wrongness of racist speech, as distinguished from
the possible harmful social and psychological consequences of such speech in
particular cases.
In particular, this Article suggests that the use of crudely insulting racist
invective, in the form of invidious racial epithets, alone or in the context of
other speech, remains a significant problem. Most or all of such speech may
constitutionally be restricted, chiefly on the grounds that such speech, inher-
ently or in its context, does not amount to an attempt to communicate any par-
ticular social idea and therefore fails to fall within the class of speech in the
constitutional sense, or speech the legal protection of which promotes the range
of values or purposes that might be thought to underlie the free speech clause.
In most or all cases in which racial epithets occur in the context of a more ex-
tended speech which by itself or in conjunction with the racial epithet commu-
nicates a sufficient social idea to otherwise qualify for free speech protection,
it will ordinarily be possible to disaggregate the speech into a protected idea-
tional component and an unprotected racist epithet component. Such speech may
then be restricted not insofar as it conveys a particular social idea but insofar
as the racist epithet's use either imposes social or psychological harms on its
target or victim, or, more importantly, is thought of by the society as an act
of deontic moral wrong.
It is, of course, possible to argue that at least in some contexts the social
7. Compare, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6 (detecting only minimal free speech constraints) with Heins,
Banning Words: A Comment on "Words Thai Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
9. See, e.g., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (en banc).
10. See, e.g., Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
11. See, e.g., Cotterrell, Prosecuting Incitement to Racial Hatred, 1982 PUB. L. 378.
12. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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idea will be analytically inseverable from the invidious racial epithet or that
the racial epithet itself necessarily bespeaks or implies or conjures up and seeks
to convey a sufficient social idea. Perhaps surprisingly, in a number of the litiga-
ted cases, these claims are simply implausible. More importantly, though, it
will be seen that proscribing racial epithets is crucially unlike proscribing words
such as "solidarity" or "Jefferson." The latter may be examples of linguistic tokens
that are indispensable, in the sense that at least at a particular time and place
there are no substitutes for them that can as adequately communicate the speaker's
intended message, insofar as protection of the utterance of that message pro-
motes what we have referred to as free speech values.
But there are always adequate alternatives, or semantic substitutes, for ra-
cist epithets, insofar as what is sought to be conveyed through the epithet is
a social idea, without distorting, subduing, or diluting either the social idea it-
self or the rhetorical power of conviction, or emotive force, with which it is
conveyed. One might well wish to employ a racist epithet for reasons other
than those purposes protected by the free speech clause, e.g., simply to inflict
emotional pain or to vent frustration, unrelated to any social idea one has. But
such purposes do not implicate significantly the purposes or values underlying
the free speech clause.
The practically available alternatives to sheer racist epithets will often in
fact be superior, from a free speech values standpoint, from the speaker's own
perspective. It must be admitted, however, that it cannot be conclusively demon-
strated in advance that there will never be a case in which, from the speaker's
own standpoint, there is no combination of available English words that do not
significantly distort at least the emotive meaning of his message, by compari-
son with the alternative of precisely a racist epithet, insofar as his emotive mean-
ing falls within the range of the free speech values. While the racist epithet
itself may not be perfect, it might conceivably be marginally better.
In this rare case, in which even the most fiery, impassioned rhetoric can-
not convey the protected meaning as well as rhetoric involving the use of a ra-
cial epithet, the constitutional case for tolerance is at its strongest. But the trade-off
involved in such a case should be made clear. In protecting such speech we
forfeit the societal interest in preventing or redressing the deontic wrong, as
well as the psychological and social injury attributable to the distinctive fea-
tures of the racist epithet, in order to protect not the expression of the speaker's
message, but the difference between the message conveyable using the racist
epithet and the message conveyable using the best available substitute language
from the speaker's standpoint.
This Article will thus argue that any unavoidable trade-offs between free
speech values associated with the use of racial epithets and conflicting cogniza-
ble values will be both rare and, from the standpoint of free speech values,
minimal in severity. If one seeks to impose broader restrictions, however, the
costs in terms of free speech values, as well as other values, begin to mount
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up considerably, at least in the longer term. To seek to authoritatively suppress
a range of allegedly racist social ideas, in the absence of recognizable racial
epithets, is to invite a variety of unintended adverse consequences of varying
degrees of severity. And while such a project of broad suppression of arguably
racist speech, where such speech is not otherwise actionable as an act of, say,
employment discrimination, is in some respects historically timely, in other
respects it is of historically diminishing utility. Whether one thinks of racism
as waxing or waning overall, it seems clear from the evidence that the problem
of the expression of relatively crude racist social ideas, beyond racist epithets,
of a type that it is plausible to imagine society's legally suppressing, is of histor-
ically diminishing importance, as a general tendency, whatever its absolute mag-
nitude of importance.
Thus, apart from the problem of racial epithets, as societal racism has be-
come subtler, more refined, and more equivocal, it has become less responsive
to a broad speech-suppressive legal strategy, beyond enforcing familiar civil
rights and anti-discrimination statutes. Attempts at broad legal suppression of
disfavored ideas in this context, whether successful or not, would likely en-
gender a range of adverse consequences, discussed below, that would discourage
even the proponents of such suppression, at least over the long term. This Arti-
cle thus concludes that the legal suppression of racist epithets is generally con-
sistent with the free speech clause and may in fact be well advised. This
conclusion is tested by reference to Dean Lee Bollinger's sustained argument
for the salutary effects of tolerating extremist speech. 13 However, to extend
even successful legal suppression much beyond such a line is likely, we shall
conclude, to become largely self-defeating.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON RACIST SPEECH
A. Racial Group Defamation
In exploring the inadequacies of various approaches, including that of ra-
cial group defamation, it may be useful to envision a concrete, prototypical ex-
ample of unmistakable, crude, contemporary racist speech. Imagine a black
undergraduate student walking alone on a predominantly white college cam-
pus. As a car passes, the driver sees fit to hurl an opprobrious racial epithet
at the black student. Only the targeted student hears the remark and has some
sort of unspecified psychological reaction.
As it is ordinarily conceived, a racial group defamation approach to such
an incident must falter on a number of grounds. This is so even if it is assumed
13. See generally L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA (1986).
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that prosecution for racial vilification poses no greater free speech problems
today than it did in 1952 when the Supreme Court decided Beauharnais v. Il-
linois, 14 although this premise is seriously questionable. 15 One scholar has
recently concluded that the constitutional reasoning in Beauharnais "was crip-
pled by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and its holding was unmistakably un-
done by Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps." 6 But the problems faced
by a racial group defamation approach to the prototypical incident described
above extend far beyond issues of actual malice or the burden of proof on the
issue of truth or falsity.
To begin with, the opprobrious racial epithet does not seem most plausibly
characterized as conveying a true or false statement of fact, either explicitly
or by fair inference. Typical racial epithets, however evocative, are preemi-
nently harsh, crudely insulting expressions of the speaker's negative evaluation
of the target, by virtue of the target's race. Whether the epithet seeks to com-
municate a reasonably coherent particular social idea or not, it will at most rise
to the level of what is considered in the law a statement of "opinion" and thus
not be any more actionable in racial group defamation 17 than in individual defa-
mation. 18 The most vitriolic, psychologically damaging racial invective need
not assert any statement of fact. If it does not, it will generally not be actiona-
ble on a group defamation theory. "
The example cited above would thus likely be immune from attack on a
racial group defamation theory on at least this ground. But the example could
be changed. Suppose that the speaker abjures racial epithets but delivers a scur-
rilous tirade consisting not of opinion exclusively but in material part of true
or false assertions of general fact about his target racial group. Even here, the
choices are unattractive. Regardless of whether truth is made a defense, or fal-
sity an element, 20 there are obvious prudential reasons counseling against making
14. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
15. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 n.7 (6th Cir. 1981)
and the cases collected in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
But see Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979).
16. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALF.
L. REV. 297, 330 (1988) (citations omitted). The Times case is reported at 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Hepps
at 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
17. See Post, supra note 16, at 330 ("Beauharnais depends on the argument that group libel is simply
a variant form of individual defamation.").
18. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Ollman v. Evans & Novak, 750 F.2d
970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); W. KEETON, D. Doaas, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113A, at 813 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
W. KEETON]. For criticism of this result in the context of racial defamation, see Lasson, Racial Defamation
as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 42-43 n.229 (1985).
19. See Note, Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors, 64 TEX. L. REV. 591, 608-09 (1985). See also
Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV, 682, 691-92 n.69 (1988) (res-
tricting the Note's defense of group libel laws to only those targeting potentially true or false statements
of fact). In the international comparative context, see Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARoO-
zo L. REV. 445, 496 (1987).
20. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775-76.
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the truth or falsity of carefully phrased invidious racial assertions a central ele-
ment in the case. It is difficult to imagine a forum better suited to the dema-
gogue and the seeker of publicity. The factual assertions may raise complex,
subtle, unresolved issues of natural or social science beyond the ken of most
scientists, let alone most juries. 2 The risk of error or of public misimpression
from a jury finding that the factual claims are not provably false, with an ensu-
ing propaganda harvest, seems large. 22 The misconceived factual inquiry would
predictably come to dominate the trial, until such time as the presiding judge
risked accusations of censorship and suppression by limiting the scope and length
of the defendant's presentation on the issue of falsity. This is all quite aside
from the fact that the judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of the defendant's
claims is likely to be inherently demeaning to the targeted group.
One possible response to this problem would be to revive the tradition of
libel prosecutions in which truth or falsity is legally irrelevant. 23 Just as a defen-
dant might defame or otherwise injure through speech an individual member
of a racial group, or the racial group itself, without making any assertion of
fact, so an individual member of a group, or the group itself, may be injured
by speech that is at least technically true, if perhaps incomplete or misguided.
While such an approach would minimize a number of the problems noted above,
it obviously faces substantial free speech and due process hurdles; and it sug-
gests that some tort theory other than group defamation is perhaps more ap-
propriate. 24 At the pragmatic level, the possibilities for martyrdom of a defendant
who is found civilly or criminally liable for speaking what he will attempt to
portray as an important alleged social truth seem substantial.
Of course, a racial group defamation approach to the racial epithet inci-
dent posed above faces other problems as well. If the action is thought of as
civil in nature, it is not clear whether the proper plaintiff would be the individual
target addressed or all persons encompassed within the scope of the racial epithet
employed. 25 This choice raises issues not only of standing, but also of the the-
ory and measure of damages, as well as even more basic issues. If the group
allegedly defamed by the slander cannot show that the language employed fits
21. See Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974
SuP. CT. REV. 281, 301 (1975).
22. See Kretzmer, supra note 19, at 496.
23. See W. KEETON, supra note 18, § 116, at 840.
24. At least with regard to plaintiffs who are not public figures or public officials, the Supreme Court
has not yet required the showing of a false claim of fact in cases brought on a theory of intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress. For a contrary rule in the case of public figure plaintiffs, see Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Whether black Americans, for example, would count as a "public figure
group" by the standards of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) for purposes of the tort of
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress has not yet been judicially resolved. See the discussion
in Comment, Group Defamation and Individual Actions: A New Look at an Old Rule, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
1532, 1553 (1983).
25. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1545. In the context of actions brought on behalf of large religious
groups, see Talal v. Fanning, 506 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
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into a limited number of traditional categories, it may have to show actual
damages to the group caused by the defendant's language in order to recover. 26
Actual damages causally attributable to the particular defendant's remarks, in
the absence of some concert of action theory that allows the plaintiff to rely
on the harms attributable to racist speech generally, may be difficult to show.
In the racial epithet incident postulated above, there is, of course, no ac-
tionable defamation because the allegedly defamatory language was by hypothesis
not published to a third party. 27 If the theory is racial group defamation, there
is arguably still no publication if the racial epithets are addressed exclusively
to even a large audience of the verbally targeted race. As well, it is at least
arguable that invidious racial epithets heard only by target group members are
not defamatory, at least in the traditional sense, in that such language in those
circumstances would not tend to impair the target group's reputation in the com-
munity or to deter others from dealing with the target group, 28 however morally
wrong, offensive, or psychologically damaging the epithets were. Such language
under such circumstances impairs dignity, self-esteem, or a number of other
crucial values, 29 but not reputation. 30
The defamatory character of even the most venomous racial epithets may
in fact remain at least contestable if the epithets are also heard by non-target
group members. If the hearers who are not target racial group members can
be shown already to have been racially prejudiced against the target group, the
target group's reputation may well have been unaffected, or reinforced, but not
impaired or diminished by the racist invective. 31 But if the non-target group
members were not racially prejudiced, their natural reactions may range from
mild disdain to shock and outrage toward the speaker and from indifference
to active sympathy for the targeted group. 32 Defamation, or the damages flowing
from defamation, may even under these circumstances be contestable.
B. Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress
The strategy of reliance on the tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress, has had at best limited success to date in the context
of racist invective. The tort itself is ordinarily defined in narrow, restrictive
26. See W. KEETON, supra note 18, § 112, at 788-95.
27. See id. at § 113; Note, supra note 15, at 309.
28. See W. KEETON, supra note 18, § 111, at 774.
29. See generally Delgado, supra note 6.
30. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1532.
31. See Note, supra note 15, at 311.
32. Note as well that criminal prosecution for attempts to incite racial hatred or fear or a breach of the
peace may also be difficult if the language used can be shown to have instead had a natural and probable
tendency under the circumstances to promote sympathy for the target group. See Cotterrell, supra note 11,
at 379.
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terms. 3 One commentator has accurately observed that:
Courts generally impose strict culpability requirements, permitting such actions
only where the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff mental
suffering. Further, the cause of action is normally limited to those cases in which
the plaintiff has suffered a severe degree of emotional distress as the result of
the defendant's "extreme and dangerous" conduct exceeding all reasonable bounds
of decency. .4
In elaborating on the degree of severity of emotional distress required, one court
has observed that the distress must be "so severe that no reasonable man could
be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are fac-
tors to be considered in determining its severity." 3
Some plaintiffs have successfully stated a cause of action on this theory
in cases involving the defendant's use of racial epithets and racial invective against
the plaintiff, but such cases generally involve other sorts of allegedly outra-
geous conduct in addition to the verbal epithets," as well as special circum-
stances and a special relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant37 not characteristic of our archetypal campus racial epithet case.
Whether even the repeated use of racial epithets would have sufficed to consti-
tute intentional infliction of severe emotional distress must remain unclear as
long as the plaintiff also alleges such grounds as arbitrary, groundless demo-
tion or dismissal from the job. 38 Similarly, it is unclear whether verbal abuse
of a stranger will suffice if those plaintiffs who have successfully stated a cause
of action have alleged employee status, as well as the defendant's knowledge
of the plaintiff's particular susceptibility to emotional distress and violation of
union status. 39
At least in the absence of a relevant special relationship or special "aggravat-
ing" circumstances, courts have been reluctant to allow "mere" use of racial
epithets to reach a jury on a theory of intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress. 4o The typical judicial analysis has involved a denunciation of the ra-
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) and the representative case of Johnson v. Samp-
son, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926). For discussion of the development of the tort, see Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
34. Comment, supra note 24, at 1550 (citation omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46 (1965)).
35. Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 215, 638 P.2d 423, 427 (Ct. App. 1981).
36. See, e.g., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Alcom v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (en banc).
38. See, e.g., id. at 498, 468 P.2d at 219, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
39. See id. at 498, 468 P.2d at 218-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91. The en banc California Supreme Court
concluded explicitly that "plaintiffs status as an employee should entitle him to a greater degree of protection
from insult and outrage than if he were a stranger to defendants." Id. at 498 n.2, 468 P.2d at 218 n.2, 86
Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.2. If this is for no other reason, it may reflect the employee's "captive audience" status
and his or her inability to ignore the employer. See Contreras, 88 Wash. 2d at 741, 565 P.2d at 1176.
40. See, e.g., Lay v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 379 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Irving v.
J. L. Marsh, Inc., 46 Il1. App. 3d 162, 360 N.E.2d 983 (1977); Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 346 Pa.
Super. 357, 499 A.2d 648 (1985).
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cial epithets as objectionable, 41 but a characterization of the use of racial epithets
as merely offensive, "insulting namecalling,"42 for which, in light of the typi-
cally modest physical or psychological symptoms resulting, 43 no recovery may
be had.
As the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress is tradi-
tionally understood, these results are generally predictable and in that sense
justified. Of course, the courts err in suggesting that the use of racial epithets
by a member of a historically dominant racial group against a member of a
traditionally explicitly subordinated racial group, in the American historical con-
text, is essentially indistinguishable from mere rude forms of address or mere
offensive namecalling. 44 But the problem is not so much insensitive or unduly
constricted application of the tort, but its substantial misdirectedness even in
theory. One may argue that the use of racial epithets is not so "extreme,"4
at least in the sense of so statistically infrequent, as to fit within the tort, and
one may point out that even predictable adverse psychological and social con-
sequences flowing from the tort will not suffice unless the plaintiff's reaction
can be characterized as "severe."46
All of this hardly establishes that the defendant's conduct cannot reasona-
bly be thought of as tortious. Instead, it merely demonstrates that the tort of
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress is an inapt vehicle and is poorly
designed for the job. As this Article suggests more generally below, the es-
sence of what is wrong with the use of racial epithets is not that it is offen-
sive, 47 or that it is offensive and is becoming less common historically, 48 or
even that it is offensive and is becoming in the minds of its targets increasingly
so. 49 The essence of the public policy underlying the wrongness of the use
of racial epithets is instead that it is morally wrong, largely independent of its
degree of popularity or offensiveness. There would be good grounds in public
policy for holding such activity tortious even if it were quite common and even
if its victims had been socialized or impelled by circumstances to regard it as
only minimally offensive.
Similarly, the essence of what is condemnable about racial epithets is not,
as we shall see below, that they can by themselves be proved to inflict genuine-
ly grievous, severe psychological injury on their targets, in some subjectively
perceived sense. All this may be difficult to show in any particular case, despite
the undoubtedly devastating, profound, and subtle short and long-term conse-
41. See Irving, 46 111. App. 3d at 167, 360 N.E.2d at 986; Dawson, 346 Pa. Super. at 360, 499 A.2d at 649.
42. See Dawson, 346 Pa. Super. at 360, 499 A.2d at 649.
43. See id. The plaintiff in Dawson alleged, inter alia, that "she cried and was unable to gain her com-
posure for one-half hour." Id.
44. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d, illustration 4 (1965)).
45. See id.
46. See Irving, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 167, 360 N.E.2d at 986.
47. See Dawson, 346 Pa. Super. at 360, 499 A.2d at 649.
48. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499 n.4, 468 P.2d 216, 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr.
88, 91 n.4 (1970) (en banc).
49. See id.
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quences of American racist patterns and practices generally. 50 Whether it is
scientifically demonstrable fact or not, it is certainly at least conceivable that
persons who as a group are continually subjected to racist treatment, including
racist epithets, tend to adapt in various ways so as to reduce their sensitivity
in terms of the largely psychological shock effects measured by the tort of out-
rage. Even if no exotic psychological defense mechanisms are called into play
to reduce one's direct psychological vulnerability to such shocks, the shocks
might at least conceivably be reduced by the ordinary process of inurement
through repeated exposure. 51
But it is hardly a decisive argument against a legal restriction of racist epithets
that the victims of such epithets tend to adapt, perhaps in self-defeating, self-
destructive ways, such as by identifying with their tormentors 5 2 or with reduced
levels of self-esteem, 13 to racist depredations, even if any such adaptation takes
place merely because such perhaps inevitable adaptations reduce the severity
of the victim's emotional distress in the particular ways for which the tort of
outrage provides redress. At least in this context, the legal system should not
single out, among all possible victim reactions, near hysteria as the sole com-
pensable reaction, while ignoring the possibility of more severe, but less spec-
tacular or less overtly manifested or less outwardly directed, victim reactions. 1,
More fundamentally, the law should not ignore what a hard-won societal con-
sensus has established as the elemental wrongness of the use of racial epithets,
independent of any emotional distress or other psychological reactions they may
cause. At the very least, as we shall see, the free speech clause does not preclude
the recognition of a tort that focuses not so much on the tort's "unendurability"
in virtue of the victim's reaction, 5  but on the tort's "unendurability" in terms
of the clarity with which basic social norms have been flouted.
50. See generally Delgado, supra note 6.
51. See the defendant's contention in this regard, not definitively rejected on appeal, in Alcorn, 2 Cal.
3d at 499 n.4, 468 P.2d at 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91 n.4.
52. See Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 213, 638 P.2d 423, 425 (Ct. App. 1981) ("Social scientists
agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting
to dissociate themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority negative attitudes toward
the minority.") (emphasis omitted).
53. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 136-37 (discussing doubt of self-worth and self-hatred among the stig-
matized); Kretzmer, supra note 19, at 466 (discussing self-hatred and adverse impact on social relation-
ships). See also Thomas & Hughes, The Continuing Significance of Race: A Study of Race, Class, and Quality
of Life in America, 1972-1985, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 830 (1986) (blacks as scoring lower than whites on vari-
ous measures of psychological well-being, even when social class is controlled for). Of course, these adapta-
tions are in response to racism generally, and not distinctively in response to racist speech, let alone the
type of racial epithet speech that is the focus of this section. This is irrelevant to our point, which is that
even if we assume that blacks adapt to racial epithet speech in ways that minimize the sorts of injuries tradi-
tionally central to severe emotional distress such speech could still sensibly be viewed as tortious on some
revised, alternative theory.
54. See supra notes 52 & 53.
55. Cf Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 215, 638 P.2d at 427 ("[tjhe law intervenes only where the distress in-
flicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it").
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C. Criminalization of Racist Speech
Criminalizing racist speech has the advantage of shifting the focus from
the relations between a particular victim and perpetrator to the question of the
wilful violation of basic norms from which the community derives not only sta-
bility but also its legitimacy as a community respectful of the elemental dignity
of its constituent members. The use of racist epithets, in particular, is ordinari-
ly a knowing, wilful breach of minimal community solidarity, and it is appropriate
that the judicial response take the form of an authoritative expression of repu-
diation in the name of the community itself.
However, drafting a practically workable criminal statute that can be ef-
fectively used to vindicate the community's rejection of racist speech, however
defined, while respecting the recognized free speech rights and interests of speak-
ers, the audience, and the public generally has proven unexpectedly difficult.
Adverse consequences and intractable dilemmas, both anticipated and unantic-
ipated, loom large. While other countries continue to experiment with limited
success, 5 6 statutory criminalization of racist speech has had limited appeal for
American states. 57
Some of the recurring problems associated with criminalizing racist speech
can be briefly illustrated as choices confronted by the statutory drafters. First,
one must overcome the daunting challenge of defining the target kind of speech,
the necessary state of mind or intent on the part of the defendant, the undesira-
ble result of the speech that is sought to be suppressed, the nature and kind
of causation between speech and result, and the degree to which those results
must have been predictable. I8 Apart from any concerns for freedom of speech,
one must draft a reasonably broad-ranging, efficacious statute, lest the statute
become merely an empty symbol, while providing fair notice of its scope and
not criminalizing speech which under the circumstances may seem justifiable
or excusable.
A number of these problems do not seem resolvable by experimental tinker-
ing with the wording of the criminal statute. For example, one might reduce
the difficulty of proving the defendant's intent by statutorily emphasizing the
actual or probable consequences of the defendant's speech. But the more ex-
56. See generally Cotterrell, supra note 11; Hadfield, The Prevention of Incitement to Religious Hatred-An
Article of Faith?, 35 N. IRELAND L.Q. 231 (1984); Hughes, Prohibiting Incitement to Racial Discrimina-
tion, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 361 (1966); Lasson, Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free Speech,
7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161 (1987); Lederman & Tabory, Criminalization of Racial Incitement in Israel,
24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 55 (1987); Leopold, Incitement to Hatred- The History of a Controversial Criminal
Offense, 1977 PUB. L. 389.
57. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1547 ("criminal defamation laws are virtually nonexistent in modern
criminal codes").
58. For a sense of the difficulties in proving such matters as the probability of provoking "hatred," as
opposed to that of provoking a breach of the peace, see Cotterrell, supra note 11, at 379; Hadfield, supra
note 56, at 242 (" '[H]atred' is not the same as distaste, disgust, odium or even anger.").
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treme and outrageous the racist speech, hence the greater the speech's vulnera-
bility to suppression, the greater the likelihood that the prosecution will not
be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the probable or actual conse-
quences of the defendant's speech were predominantly something other than
indifference, revulsion toward the speaker, or sympathy for the targets of the
speech.,9
There is as well the irresolvable conundrum of the defense of truth. 60
Perhaps in recognition of the truth that racism is in part a matter of how one
looks at, explains, or interprets the undenied facts, a statute criminalizing ra-
cist speech might deny the relevance of a defendant's claim of the truth of his
statements. 61 This would limit the potential for a criminal prosecution's turn-
ing essentially into an awkward, degrading, pseudo-scientific judicial trial on
the merits of the group targeted by the speech, with the facts being found by
amateurs and the initiative being held largely by the defendants. 62 Declining
to recognize truth as a defense might also convey the public sentiment that some
values simply outrank unrestricted freedom of speech, even in the absence of
a public emergency.63
On the other hand, the inclination to view the truth status of propositions
addressing issues of public policy as irrelevant or of secondary importance, is
uncomfortably alien to the best traditions of Plato, 6 John Milton,65 Thomas
Jefferson, 6 6 and John Stuart Mill. 67 Certainly, any government assertions of
the essential falsity of the racist speech will inevitably ring hollow with sub-
stantial segments of the public if the government even creates the arguable ap-
pearance of not itself being sufficiently convinced of the speech's falsity to allow
such falsity to be judicially exposed through the adversary process, even if the
government's motivation is quite otherwise. 68 There is thus some force to the
argument that just as the question of clear and present danger must be deter-
mined judicially in each particular case, 69 so the balance between the pursuit
of political truth and various arguably incompatible values must, at least, be
59. See Cotterrell, supra note 11, at 379.
60. This dilemma is only heightened by requiring the prosecution to prove the falsity of the defendant's
factual claims by analogy to the logic of Phildaelphis Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps 475 U.S. 767, 774-76 (1986).
61. See Lederman & Tabory, supra note 56, at 63.
62. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
63. Cf Hughes, supra note 56, at 365 ("What is needed ... is a series of public, institutional practices
which can inculcate respect for the principle of equality.").
64. See generally PLATO, THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES & CwrIo (L. Dyer ed. 1976).
65. See generally J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (G. Sabine ed. 1951).
66. See generally T. JEFFERSON, THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON (M. Peterson ed. 1977). See also
Justice Brandeis' quotations from Jefferson in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring).
67. See generally J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
68. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
69. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Defendant must
be allowed in each individual case to show absence of clear and present danger, any general legislative decla-
ration concerning speech of the general character of the defendant's notwithstanding.).
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made judicially in each particular case, rather than once and for all by the legis-
lature for the broad category of racist speech. Weighing the value of truth against
that of solidarity, or of legally enforced solidarity, seems less manageable in
the abstract than in particular cases.
Similarly difficult issues are posed by the question of whether the criminal
statute should require that all prosecutions be brought only with the consent
of some designated relatively highly-placed public official. 70 While the higher
authorities may be more sensitive to the importance of free speech concerns
than local prosecutors charged with preventing disruptive incidents 71 and while
requiring higher approval might well result in more politically astute selection
of cases for prosecution, as well as affirming the value of equal dignity from
the highest levels of government, there are obvious costs in imposing such a
requirement. If local authorities are inclined to prosecute, the failure of higher
authorities to acquiesce, even for justified reasons, 72  may be perceived as
legitimizing, if not endorsing, the content of the speech. Declining to prose-
cute because of realistic fears of the weakness of the government's case on perhaps
one element may well be read by some of those most deeply concerned as in-
dicating bias, insensitivity, or cowardice on the part of the highest governmen-
tal authorities. The government's choice will often be difficult because the most
influential or most popular racist speakers, successful prosecution of whom might
create the greatest benefit, will tend to be those whose unsuccessful prosecu-
tion may be both relatively likely and politically most disastrous. 71
Finally, there is the controversial issue of whether the criminal statute should
by its terms apply to racist speech directed by members of historically oppressed
groups against groups not historically oppressed, or what would otherwise be
racist speech if such historical power relationships did not obtain. While this
problem is not unique to a criminal law response to racist speech, a criminal
statute opposing racist speech poses the problem in particularly stark fashion.
There is a certain superficial evenhandedness in criminalizing both anti-black
and anti-white speech, but the costs of successful prosecution of black speakers
where some arguably comparable white speakers are acquitted or left
unprosecuted 74 may be substantial. 75 More fundamentally, it is deeply ques-
tionable whether black victims of racist speech are genuinely similarly situated
70. See the discussion of this requirement in the international context in Kretzmer, supra note 19, at
502-03; Lederman & Tabory, supra note 56, at 64; Leopold, supra note 56, at 397.
71. See Kretzmer, supra note 19, at 502.
72. See Leopold, supra note 56, at 404 (discussing the expedience of declining to prosecute particular
cases); see also E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 163 (1985) (some prosecutions as securing greater pub-
licity for the speakers).
73. See Leopold, supra note 56, at 404.
74. For a sense of the legitimate reasons for not prosecuting some such figures, see supra notes 71-72
and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Leopold, supra note 56, at 397-98; see also E. BARENDT, supra note 72, at 163 (discuss-
ing convictions of militant blacks).
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with at least those whites who are targeted as members of an undifferentiated
white community. In many particulars, this debate must recapitulate the cur-
rently not fully resolved controversy between formal or color-blind neutrality
and more compensatory or historically-oriented strategies of affirmative action. 76
It is, at least, hardly self-evident that anti-black and anti-white speech must
rationally be regarded as symmetrical harms in nature and degree.
In sum, if the inescapable constitutional problems, including free speech
problems, associated with criminalizing racist speech are set aside, the primary
disincentive to adopting a criminal law restricting racist speech is not any sin-
gle insuperable theoretical obstacle, but the discouragement induced by having
to confront a series of difficult subordinate choices. Whether the cumulative
cost of these choices becomes excessive may well depend upon one's appraisal
of the constitutional permissibility of such statutes, the free speech dimensions
of which are explored below.
III. DEONTIC TORTS AND THE PROBLEM OF SPEECH THAT DOES LESS
OR MORE THAN CONVEY A SOCIAL IDEA
One reason why racist insults, or insults of persons as members of histori-
cally subordinated groups, are distinguishable from "mere insults" and other
such offenses is that "'they conjure up the entire history of racial discrimina-
tion in this country."' 77 But an incident or an image or an object can "conjure
up" a broad history or a social idea, without itself being speech in the constitu-
tional sense. Despite the accumulated culture baggage toted by racial epithets,
in many concrete instances, the plainest interpretation of the racist epithets in-
volved is that they amount to "general [verbal] abuse"78 rather than constitu-
tional speech. Speech that does not seek to communicate at least some sort of
social idea does not ordinarily implicate the purposes or values underlying the
free speech clause79 and therefore falls outside the compass of the free speech
clause. 80 Professor Paul Chevigny has suggested that "[t]he essence of the no-
tion of 'speech' for purposes of political protection is that it puts forth an argu-
76. Compare, e.g., Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of
Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 25-26 (P. Kurland ed. 1975) and Van Alstyne, Rites of Pas-
sage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979) (arguing against
any differential treatment by government based on race) with Lempert, The Force of Irony: On the Morality
of Affirmative Action and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 95 ETHIcs 86-89 (1984) (Moral revulsion against
alleged anti-white discrimination draws much of its moral force from centuries of racial oppression of rela-
tively powerless blacks.).
77. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (quoting Delgado, supra note 6, at 157).
78. Bradshaw v. Swagerty, I Kan. App. 2d 213, 215, 563 P.2d 511, 514 (1977).
79. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79
(1963) (specifying the values of self-fulfillment, ascertainment of truth, the process of societal decision-making,
and maintenance of a balance between social stability and social change).
80. See generally Wright, A Rationale from J. S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.
149 (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1986).
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ment that must be understood, that is susceptible to explanation or response
through other arguments before any other sort of action is taken."8' One need
not even adopt this rigorous formulation to recognize that the point, from the
standpoint of the purposes of the free speech clause, of protecting at least some
instances of the use of racial epithets is obscure.
Racial epithets may be resorted to, for example, in the context of an ordi-
nary dispute over a parking space 82 or in an ordinary dispute over a depart-
ment store lay-away ticket. 83 Publicly embarrassing racial references not in-
volving racial epithets can also occur in contexts not fairly suggestive of any
intent to convey any associated social idea." While it is easy to assume that
all earnest use of racial epithets must be charged with a "view" " of some fea-
ture of society or its proper ordering, 8 this assumption is universally sound
only if we attribute to some speech an implausibly sweeping intent. The actual,
substantive social ideational content that is necessarily implied, regardless of
circumstances, by any particular racial epithet is minimal at best. 87
To illustrate the importance of this recognition, we may take the example
of the controversy over the use of the restaurant trade name "Sambo's ."88 If
the government on some theory seeks to restrict the use of that particular trade
name as racially offensive, the conventional legal response may be to assume
not only that all offense is alike for constitutional purposes, but also that offense
and distaste are simply the inevitable price of a robustly exercised freedom of
speech. 8 But on our approach, a prior question must be asked if free speech
concerns are to be implicated: were the owners of Sambo's Restaurants attempting
to communicate some recognizable social idea through the use of that trade name?
If, as judicially appears to be the case, they were not, o their use of the trade
name "Sambo's" should not be thought to cognizably implicate free speech
concerns.
81. P. CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH 100 (1988). See also Lasson, supra note 18, at 33 (noting the possibil-
ity of construing racial defamation as non-speech, akin to hard-core pornography).
82. See Lay v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 379 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam)
(threat to plaintiffs job, followed by argument over a parking space).
83. See Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 346 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 499 A.2d 648, 648 (1985) (plaintiff
customer's dispute over lay-away ticket with store employee; employee resorted to racial epithet).
84. See, e.g., Gaiters v. Lynn, 831 F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir. 1987) (personally directed remark by singer
during concert referring to plaintiffs.appearance; remarks intended to be humorous).
85. See Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 931 (N.D. I11. 1984).
86. See id. at 927.
87. Cf Irving v. J. L. Marsh, Inc., 46 111. App. 3d 162, 166, 360 N.E.2d 983, 985 (1977) ("In arguing
that [a particular racial epithet] implies that an individual is generally lacking in the virtues of honesty, intel-
ligence, or creativity, we believe plaintiff attributes a definition to the word that is far in excess of its meaning.").
88. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981); Sambo's
of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
89. See Sanbos of Ohio, Inc., 466 F. Supp. at 180; see also Heins, supra note 7, at 587-88. See gener-
ally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
90. The record establishes that the name "Sambo" was chosen because of associations with pancakes,
as well as the coincidence of combining portions of the names of two of the principals. See Sambo's Restaur-
ants, Inc., 663 F.2d at 698 n.4.
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It may seem curious to decline to classify some literal speech, especially
insofar as it may offend, or inflict suffering upon, identifiable groups, as speech
in the constitutional sense. It is therefore useful to bear in mind what this claim
does not amount to. It is not a claim that literal speech falls outside the scope
of the free speech clause if it is primitive or fallacious, 91 or if it offers social
ideas of no discernible "substance or merit," 92 or if it touches upon social ideas
that threaten basic values 93 or that must be regarded as settled. " Declining
to extend free speech protection to literal speech that does not seek to convey
any social idea is thus far removed from assuming that some "fighting faith,"9 "
the truth of which we are at least for the moment convinced, justifies us in sup-
pressing some disfavored speech.
It must certainly be admitted, however, that not all literal speech involving
recourse to racial epithets will be entirely outside the scope of the free speech
clause on this analysis. Racial epithets themselves are predictably offensive and
derogatory, if only in an undifferentiated sort of way. 96 Beyond this, at least
some uses of racial epithets involve an intent to communicate the social idea
"that distinctions of race are distinctions of merit, dignity, status and person-
hood."97 On some occasions, racial epithets are employed in the immediate
context of at least tersely explicit statements of evaluative or descriptive social
propositional statements. 98 Just as "an intent to injure another can accompany
the expression of ideas," 99 so the expression of ideas can accompany an intent
to injure.
In such cases the government should not be barred by the free speech clause
from severing or disaggregating the distinctive offense or distinctive moral wrong
of the racial epithet from the cognitive or, to the extent constitutionally pro-
tected, the emotive meaning ' 00 of the speech. Such speech would not be sub-
ject to restriction insofar as it sought to convey a social idea, or in respect of
its attempting to convey a social idea, even if that idea, however expressed,
is inherently offensive to some degree. But such speech would be subject to
91. Cf Lasson, supra note 18, at 39 ("[llittle, if any intellect is necessary to hurl racial epithets").
92. Id. at 45.
93. See Hughes, supra note 56, at 363.
94. See id.
95. See Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, supra note 6, at 374-75 (quoting
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
96. See Clarke v. Board of Educ., 215 Neb. 250, 256, 338 N.W.2d 272, 275 (1983).
97. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 136.
98. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 941, 603 P.2d 58, 64, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 146
(1979) (en banc).
99. Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Dis-
tress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (1985).
100. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (free speech protection accorded to "otherwise inexpressible emotions").
See also Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1595 (1987); Farber, Civilizing
Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen
v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283.
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restriction insofar as it involves the injury infliction or deontic wrong of racial
epithet speech.
This approach does not assume governmental infallibility or simply cast
aside concerns for the pursuit of truth, self-realization, political participation,
or other values thought to underlie the free speech clause. I'l These values would
be jeopardized only if governmental restriction of the use of racial epithets sup-
pressed or distorted, to a significant degree, the cognitive or, to the extent other-
wise protected, the emotive meaning intended by the speaker. The potential
for suppression or distortion of the social ideas sought to be conveyed by the
speech is essentially a function of the degree of adequacy, from the standpoint
of the speaker's own view of the free speech values he or she wishes to exercise
and promote, of the alternative means or channels with which his or her mes-
sage practically may be conveyed, that are left open and available for the speaker's
use. 102 As a matter of logic, the courts should be reluctant to find a free speech
violation where the complaining party is left with alternative means for con-
veying his or her message that are essentially as good from the speaker's own
perspective on the relevant free speech values.
In a somewhat broader context, Justice Stevens has observed that a "re-
quirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on
the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few,
if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive lan-
guage." 103 This is equally true in the context of racial epithet speech and is
true not merely for the cognitive content of racist epithets, but also for the emotive
content as well. Doubtless there is some sense in which a change in form neces-
sarily involves some degree of change in content and in which no formulation
of words is ever perfectly interchangeable with another, in all respects and for
all purposes. 104 But a government regulation that prohibited, for example, the
use of the phrase "looking glass," while leaving open and unimpaired the avail-
ability of the alternative word "mirror," would leave most speakers with what
might be called a free speech value-equivalent means of communicating, regard-
less of the presence or absence of any repressive government intent. 105
It is at least possible that a speaker may plausibly claim that requiring him
to convey the protected emotive force of his message through means other than
racial epithets not only impairs his general autonomy, as would virtually any
101. See Emerson, supra note 79, at 878-79.
102. For a discussion of the importance of the availability of constitutionally adequate alternative speech
channels, see generally Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central Impor-
tance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. (1989) (forthcoming).
103. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n. 18 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
104. See generally the popular expression of this theme in M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE
EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964).
105. See generally Wright, supra note 102.
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police power regulation of any sort of activity, o6 but also distorts his message
to some significant degree. Ordinarily, of course, it will be far from clear why
the profundity, fervor, and certitude of one's convictions about any social issue
cannot be conveyed without recourse to racial epithets. 107 That one feels quite
strongly, or is willing to violate certain taboos because of the fervency of one's
belief, does not seem incommunicable, to the extent it is relevant to free speech
values, by means other than racial epithets. At the very least, such emotive
messages do not seem inherently susceptible to more accurate or more power-
ful conveyance through racial epithets, to the extent that the sentiments involved
can be faithfully communicated by language at all. 108
Some of the divergence in meaning between racial epithet speech and non-
racial epithet speech will be sheer "noise," in the sense of meaning variance
neither consciously nor unconsciously considered or intended by the speaker.
Some of the remaining variance will implicate no social idea. Presumably, a
major reason why speakers of racist epithets would nonetheless object to restric-
tions on such speech would be their desire, at best irrelevant to free speech
values, to inflict emotional pain on their targets. But to the extent that genuine
free speech values are significantly implicated by such speech restrictions, any
loss in free speech values from the speaker's standpoint must be considered in
light of any free speech value loss, including speech autonomy loss, on the part
of the targets of racist epithets, as well as the importance attributed to the sheer
moral disvalue of racist epithets. Just as a speaker's autonomy, as a speaker,
may legitimately be restricted to the extent necessary to criminalize verbal fraud,
bribery, and blackmail, 109 so there is the possibility of justifying government
restrictions on racist speech. Ultimately, it must be remembered that the benefits
of restricting racial epithet speech must reflect the continuing unrestricted avail-
ability of other offensive, immoral ways of discussing racial groups. The poli-
cy logic of not restricting such alternatives is discussed below. But it is equally
necessary to remember that the free speech costs of restricting racial epithet
speech must be discounted to reflect the availability of alternative means of speak-
106. Cf J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 11-20 (R. Campbell ed. 1977) (law as the command
of the sovereign to a subject).
107. While few of us are capable of the rhetorical power of, for example, a Winston Churchill or a Jesse
Jackson, similarly few of us make our closest approach to the force and conviction of a Churchill or a Jack-
son through the use distinctively of racial epithets.
108. To the extent that one's sentiments or ideas or emotions cannot be successfully communicated by
that person at all, government restrictions on his or her language in that context will generally not impair
the speaker's freedom of speech, assuming the speaker's inarticulateness is not attributable to the govern-
ment. Cf G. ORWELL, 1984 (1983) (depicting the ability of a government, partially through control of lan-
guage, to control the generation and articulability of particular thoughts).
109. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976)
(verbal proposals of illegal acts not within the same category as ordinary commercial speech) (citing Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)).
[VOL. 9; 1
RACIST SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ing that may be superior, 110 essentially as good, 1 or nearly as good from a
free speech values standpoint.
Racial epithet speech may, therefore, in principle be subject to general re-
striction by government. The underlying rationale or justification for actually
imposing such a restriction, given the constitutional legitimacy of doing so, is,
however, controversial. The approaches referred to above in Section II tended
generally to focus on concrete, individualized injuries to the particular plain-
tiff. 112 While the interests served by such restrictions are occasionally referred
to broadly, 113 to the extent that such restrictions are aimed at promoting the"psychological well-being" 11 4 of the targets of racial epithets, the theory of re-
stricting the speech may be misfocused. Restrictions of speech based on the
content of the speech are generally disfavored. I1 1 Restricting racial epithet speech
on the basis of contingent, speculative, unsystematic, causally obscure conse-
quences for the broad psychological well-being of individual targets provides
a relatively shaky foundation for such disfavored restrictions and may be no
truer to our underlying motivations for restricting racial epithet speech than
the less contingent, more straightforward deontic approach emphasized in this
Article.
In some sense, it is doubtless true that "[tihe psychological or emotional
harm alleged in [racial epithet] cases can be proved in the same manner as in
other torts that protect psychological well-being."" 6 However, most of the more
serious potential psychological consequences of racist epithets, including so-
cial alienation, lower self-esteem, reduced aspirations, as well as effects on
parenting practices, 1 7 may be ascribable to racism generally in some form,
but not identifiable in any particular case involving racist epithets. Even if the
plaintiff can show by a preponderance of the evidence a harm such as decreased
self-esteem or less effective parenting, it will ordinarily be difficult at best for
the plaintiff to show that the identified harmful psychological effects can be
attributed not to his or her cumulative experience with disadvantage, poverty,
110. Again, it is entirely possible that a government restriction on racist epithets may coerce a user of
racial epithets into using a form of speech that is actually higher in free speech values from the speaker's
own subjective standpoint than that of racial epithets, if the speaker's preference for racial epithets reflects
values other than free speech values, such as the speaker's desire to lash out satisfyingly, to inflict pain,
or to attract attention of whatever sort to the speaker.
111. Most instances of the use of racial epithets, even if thought to at least imply some social idea, seem
susceptible of reformulation so as to express pungently the speaker's contempt, animosity, or resentment
without the use of racial epithets. See, e.g., the language and context of Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp.
923, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 539, 399 A.2d 225, 227, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979); Clarke v. Board of Educ., 212 Neb. 250, 252-53, 338 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1983).
112. See supra notes 14-76 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6, at 173 ("The primary government interest served by a tort action
for racial insults is the elimination of the harms of racism and racial insults.
114. Id. at 171.
115. See generally Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189
(1983).
-116. Delgado, supra note 6, at 167.
117. See id. Part I.
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or racism or to a long-term of exposure to racist epithets from various persons
not acting in any recognizable concert, but to the particular racial epithets of
the particular defendant in the particular case. 118
Even if the incremental harmful psychological effects of particular instances
of the use of racial epithets could be shown reliably and at a reasonable cost,
such an approach to racial epithets would largely miss the point. The public
sentiment that persons should not be legally required to endure racist epithets
is not exclusively a reflection of the intensity, duration, or overall psychologi-
cal severity of the injury 1I9 or of a concern that the public esteem in which
such victims are held will be diminished as a result of such epithets. 120 The
public sentiment involved is not so dependent upon such contingent reactions
of the victims or of other persons. Instead, such public sentiment more straight-
forwardly reflects the historically strengthening consensus that the use of racial
epithets in typical cases involves a clear violation of an important public norm.
It is not necessarily that racial epithets have become more abusive and insult-
ing than formerly. 121 Rather, as a society we may be less willing than former-
ly to tolerate the same degree of abuse and insult of this kind because of the
society's changing moral conceptions.
Issues such as the peculiar emotional susceptibility of particular individual
targets of racist epithets122 or of the potential for some violent or disruptive
reaction by those subjected to racist epithets' 23 are on this approach of only
tangential importance. If the targets of racist epithets had invariably become
so desensitized by repeated exposure to racist epithets that they regarded such
language with great equanimity as a matter of course or if such victims reacted
invariably with passivity or aggression turned inward only so that the threat
of a violent reaction to such epithets was nil, the use of such racist epithets
would remain just as reprehensible, if not more so, and just as fittingly subject
to some form of legal censure. As one commentator has observed with regard
to the use of ethnic slurs, "[ilt is not merely a question of preventing fights
or riots; it is a matter of dignity."' 24
The legal system's tendency to underplay what this Article has referred to
as deontic harms is illustrated, if not partially explained, by the fate of the two-
pronged approach to "fighting words" in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 125 Un-
118. Cf id. at 171 (recognizing the potential for "complex problems of proof of causation and damages"
in racial insult cases).
119. But cf Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 215, 638 P.2d 423, 427 (Ct. App. 1981) (emphasizing
the importance of such psychological concerns).
120. But cf the authorities discussed supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
121. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d at 499 n.4, 468 P.2d at 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91
n.4. (1970) (en banc).
122. See Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d at 741-43, 565 P.2d at 1177 (1977) (reject-
ing defendant's argument that as a truckdriver, truckdriver plaintiff must have become inured to abusive
language, but leaving the plaintiffs own individual vulnerabilities to such injury to the trier of fact).
123. See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 19, at 456.
124. J. TUssMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 91 (1977).
125. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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der Chaplinsky, it is reasonably clear that constitutionally unprotected fighting
words may take the form either of words tending "to incite an immediate breach
of the peace"126 or of words "which by their very utterance inflict injury." 127
But the vitality of the latter, more deontic prong has been seriously questioned. 128
At least on occasion, the latter prong has been judicially ignored in favor of
the former. 129 And this is probably unfortunate because, as Professor Hadley
Arkes has suggested, judicial emphasis on the breach of the peace prong "teaches
the worst lessons that a regime of law could possibly teach. It suggests that,
before citizens can expect the law to protect them or to vindicate their interests,
they must be prepared themselves to use violence outside the law."' 30 As well,
the absence of any violent reaction to racial epithets, along with interracial
harmony generally, 131 may at least conceivably be due to morally objection-
able socialization, if not outright repression, of the targeted victims.
Recognizing some sort of tort action or some sort of criminal liability of
some description for deontic injuries of the sort discussed above is a meaning-
ful and appropriate response to racial epithet use. A tort or criminal action in
response authoritatively vindicates and reaffirms the hard-won community sen-
timent that the use of racial epithets involves a clear and fundamental moral
wrong. The individual victim is not left alone to fend for herself through some
sort of "counterspeech" remedy, 132 which itself lends legitimacy to the appropri-
ateness of the use of racial epithets. While there are less degrading means of
reacting to some racially offensive speech-persons offended by the restaurant
name "Sambo's" may organize a boycott 133- such remedies will in some mea-
sure be insufficient. Even in the case of racially offensive speech that lends
itself to boycott, economic theory can offer no guarantees that the speaker can
be persuaded by changed marketplace incentives to cease indulging in his taste
for racially offensive speech. "I To the extent that the law can offer a remedy
for the deontic harm of racial epithet speech that approaches more nearly a
126. Id. at 572.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 143 (1974) and Sambo's Restaurants, Inc.
v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524-27
(1972)). See also Note, supra note 99, at 1756 ("What constitutes 'fighting' words has been limited to utter-
ances ...likely to provoke an immediate violent response by the addressee."). But see Sambo's Restaur-
ants, Inc., 663 F.2d at 697 n. I (Keith, J.. dissenting) (arguing for the continued viability of the infliction
of injury by their very utterance prong of the "fighting words" doctrine).
129. See, e.g., Harbin v. State, 358 So. 2d 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
130. Arkes, supra note 21, at 323.
131. See Delgado, Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity of Governmental Restrictions on
Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128, 185 (1983).
132. For an extended discussion of the role and limits of counterspeech as a remedy for objectionable
or fallacious speech, see generally P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 81.
133. See Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D. Ohio 1979). See also NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (consumer boycott of private merchants for the broadly
political purpose of protesting racial discrimination).
134. See T. SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE 178 (1983).
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guarantee of redress, the nature of the deontic injury itself suggests that it should
do so.
IV. THE DISTINCTIVE COSTS OF LEGALLY SUPPRESSING
RACIST POLITICAL SPEECH IN GENERAL
Thus far, the argument has sought to establish the logic and the permissi-
bility under the free speech clause of legal restraints on the use of racial epithets,
at least where the targets of such epithets are members of historically subordi-
nated groups. The interests at stake change, however, when it is suggested that
the government should be empowered to restrict not only racist epithets, but
at least some speech not involving the use of racist epithets that is nevertheless
racially offensive, or racist, in communicating a recognizable social idea. Such
an extended claim, while not currently widely influential in the United States,
at least has the virtue of recognizing that restricting racial epithet speech only
undeniably leaves open the possibility of deliberate infliction of suffering and
embarrassment on members of particular racial groups, if perhaps through speech
conveying a social idea. The approach argued for in this Article, it might be
said, puts a premium on avoiding only the crudest, most inane sort of racist
speech. One might argue that such an approach is class-biased.
How telling such criticisms are is controversial. Before such a judgment
can be made, however, we should consider at least briefly some of the poten-
tial costs and risks distinctively associated with governmental restriction of al-
legedly racist speech, not involving racial epithets and conveying a recognizable
social idea. Most of the burden of any argument against censoring offensive,
unpopular, or evidently false social ideas must be borne by the classic apolo-
gies for freedom of speech. 135 Perhaps the most pertinent theme that can be
developed in our particular context is that the question of whether governmen-
tal restrictions should be imposed on allegedly racist speech generally is not
a matter of the relative weights one attributes to freedom of speech and to ra-
cial equality. 136 Freedom of speech, even for generally racist speech, may in
fact tend to contribute to such racial equality as is practically attainable; and
generalized censorship of racist speech may tend significantly to impair the cause
of racial equality and community.
First, of course, the advocate of government restrictions on racist speech
135. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
J. S. MILL, supra note 67. See also L. BOLLINGER, supra note 13 (legal toleration of extremist speech as
developing the social capacity for the civic virtue of mutual tolerance).
136. But cf. the Dissenting Statement by Kenneth Barnes to the Report of the Committee on Freedom of
Expression at Yale, supra note 6, at 390 ("Under certain circumstances, free expression is outweighed by
more pressing issues, including liberation of all oppressed people and equal opportunities for minority groups.").
A narrower claim that the freedom of speech of majority groups, when used to propagate racist sentiments
generally, impairs the ability of minority groups to develop and exercise their own free speech rights and
capacities does seem interesting and important.
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generally must choose among the possible ways of defining racist speech. Res-
tricting all speech that tends to inflict even short-term discomfort on racial minori-
ties, in their capacity as racial minorities, seems a well-focused approach; but
such an approach would overlook the fact that receiving news that is unpleasant
in the short term may be beneficial or even vital in the long run. 137 On the
other hand, presuming to know in concrete detail what speech is destructive
of minority interests in the long run must prove generally unconvincing. Avoiding
these problems by defining racist speech to include only demonstrably falla-
cious claims may still occasionally involve pretensions to infallibility, as well
as leaving much radially offensive speech untouched. Ultimately, a reasonably
workable definition of racist speech that commands the agreement of even the
targets of such speech may be practically unattainable, given that not only the
behavioral patterns associated with racism, 138 but also the nature or definition
of racism itself may change historically. 139 When one adds in the complica-
tions that the racist quality of a speech may depend not only upon context, 14
but also upon the reputation or intent of the particular speaker, 141 the problem
of a satisfactory practical definition of racist speech seems daunting.
If a suitable definition of racist speech can be settled upon, the problems
of interpreting and applying the legal standard to concrete situations begin. One
possible approach, of course, is that of a continuing censorship bureaucracy.
In the end, history teaches us that "the boundaries of the forbidden cannot reliably
be drawn."142 Professor Chevigny points out that "[in the Old South, ... free-
dom of thought withered, not only in relation to slavery but generally as to all
topics, because no one could predict when a discussion might suggest a new
idea about slavery or race." '143
Assuming that legal restraints on racist speech deter racist speech, genuine
social gains may result. Enforced behavioral change, in the form of avoiding
racist speech, may tend to produce genuine attitudinal change, as persons bring
137. Glenn Loury discusses an important instance of our contemporary collective impulse to avoid short-
term discomfort, at the cost of enduring more substantial long-term costs, in Loury, The Moral Quandary
of the Black Community, 79 PUB. INT. 10, 16-19 (1985) (discussing the socially damaging consequences
of tacit censorship and self-censorship within the academic community of constructive discussion of developing
problems within or affecting contemporary black communities).
138. See generally Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 673 (1985). See also Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1379-80 (1988) (referring to now "unspoken"
forms of racist speech and thought).
139. See Pettigrew, supra note 138, at 686 ("[elven the definitions of, as well as the methods of measur-
ing, 'prejudice' and 'discrimination,' have been brought into question").
140. It has been observed in a broader context that "[q]uestions can be premature or belated, relevant
or irrelevant, superficial or profound, helpful or destructive, pointed or distracting, proper or improper."
J. TUSSMAN, supra note 124, at 71. In a more specific context, see generally Delgado, supra note 131.
141. For an important international example, see P. BAUER, REALITY AND RHETORIC: STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 87 (1984).
142. P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 81, at 103.
143. Id. Professor Chevigny concludes that "[c]ensorship, formal or informal, in every society where
it is found, tends to spread over uncensored knowledge like a stain." Id.
1988]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
their attitudes into line with their non-racist speech. 144 Even if no unpunished
racist speech occurs, however, there may be limits to society's ability to change
attitudes through enforced behavioral norms. 145 Some residue of alienated,
resentful, seething, "underground" racist speech and belief will likely remain,
fortified by the false conviction that opponents of racism are simply afraid that
their own alleged errors would be exposed by an open debate that they there-
fore cannot permit.
Among the more subtle, but potentially serious, problems that would re-
main is the loss of racist speech as an indicator of social attitudes. Before a
society or an industry adopts a program of affirmative action, for example, some
sense of the program's practical workability is desirable. But if no racist speech,
at least in a broadly defined sense, is legally permitted, the government's sense
of the feasibility of such a program may be significantly distorted"' in either
an unduly optimistic or pessimistic way. After all, an enforced absence of pub-
lic racist speech is compatible with either widespread skepticism about the norm
upheld or with its complete and universal voluntary acceptance. It may seem
worth paying some price, even one borne disproportionately by innocent vic-
tims, in order to have an improved sense of the real attitudes of much of soci-
ety. It would be particularly unfortunate, for example, if the majority were
genuinely receptive to more aggressive affirmative action programs' 47 but lit-
tle initiative was taken in that direction because in its ignorance of genuine majori-
ty attitudes society overestimated the extent of underlying, unarticulated
opposition.
As well, it is predictable that at least in the long-term, racial minorities
and the cause of racial equality would suffer from the disease of any legally
enforced secular orthodoxy, in which vitally and vividly held principles, tem-
pered in the fire of intellectual combat, gradually approach the admitted ex-
treme of lifeless platitudes and cliches which lose their power to inspire. The
Pledge of Allegiance tends to descend, in public school classrooms, to rote,
not merely because it is frequently repeated, but because it is perpetually un-
challenged. Coherent speech propagating a social idea, at least in the absence
of the gratuitous element of racial epithets, that is classified as racist, indispen-
sably serves the function of preventing the decay of the thought and rhetoric
of racial equality. Even if wholly false, racist speech is in the long term not
144. See H. SCHUMAN, C. STECH & L. BOBO, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 206-07 (1985); Pettigrew,
supra note 138, at 688 ("[Slome whites who at first simply comply with the new norms of racial equality
will in time internalize them.").
145. For a sense of the "stubbornness" of attitudes and the lengths to which a society might be pressed
in order to effectively change even erroneous beliefs, see G. HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW 37-40 (1986).
146. See Kretzmer, supra note 19, at 486-87.
147. See Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over But the Shouting, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 524, 525-26 & n. 11 (1987) (enthusiastic response to affirmative action programs by the business
community).
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without substantial value to the victims of racism itself, as John Stuart Mill has
classically given us grounds to believe. 148
These arguments seem insignificant, of course, in the context of the soci-
etal harms wreaked by racist actions that were informed and justified by racist
ideas. Racism in its most familiar senses is pernicious in the extreme. But the
wisdom of suppressing racist speech does not easily follow from this, largely
because it is possible to suppress much of the harm of racism by informal so-
cial sanctions, by education, and by the imposition of legal requirements and
legal prohibitions in the various realms of social conduct or action, 14" as dis-
tinct from speech. 150 Doubtless it is frustrating to realize that the impact of
false and misleading racist speech generally cannot invariably be immediately
effaced from the minds of its audience. 151 But this is equally true of any false
and misleading speech.
To these considerations should be added another. It is not surprising that,
as our tolerance as a society for racist speech decreases, the utility and practi-
cality of confronting racism by restricting racist speech is diminishing. Whether
racism is generally diminishing or not, it is apparently increasingly taking forms
not susceptible of address by restrictions on speech. The kinds of racist speech
most likely to inspire legal proscription will inevitably tend to be those crude,
overt forms of blatantly racist speech that may be not only relatively unpersua-
sive, but also of diminishing significance historically.
Whether or not racism is diminishing in any absolute sense, 5 2 a consen-
sus has developed that at least in the field of verbal public statements -the kind
most amenable to legal control -there has over the past few decades been "a
strong and steady movement of white attitudes from denial to affirmation of
equality."" 3 The historical "decline in the expression of racist ideology and
racist attitudes toward blacks" 5 4 has led to a "near universal affirmation of
the inadmissibility of racial prejudice in public political discourse" 55 and the
virtual public disappearance of an "explicitly segregationist, white supremacist
view." 15 6
Of course, the virtual absence from public discourse of the most crude,
148. See J. S. MILL, supra note 67, chapter II.
149. Not least among such legal instruments, of course, is the 1964 Civil Rights Act, cited supra note 1.
150. While the distinction between speech and conduct, including discriminatory conduct, is admittedly
imperfect, it seems in most instances manageable. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
151. See Glass, Anti-Racism and Unlimited Freedom of Speech: An Untenable Dualism, 8 CAN. J. PHIL.
559 (1978).
152. Compare, e.g., Kluegel & Smith, Whites'Beliefs About Blacks' Opportunity, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 518,
523 (1982) ("racial prejudice has markedly waned in the last three decades") with W. WILSON, THE DECLIN-
ING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 23 (1980) (holding open the possibility that racial conflict has not been substan-
tially reduced historically, even though its nature and form have changed).
153. H. SCHUMAN, C. STECH & L. BOBO, supra note 144, at 135.
154. Thomas & Hughes, supra note 53, at 830.
155. Loury, "Matters of Color"-Blacks and the Constitutional Order, 86 PuB. INT. 109, 114 (1987).
156. Kinder & Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life,
40 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 414, 416 (1981).
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and therefore most legally sanctionable, expressions of racism does not mean
that anonymous, clandestine, transient, "underground" expressions of crude
racism no longer occur, even, or especially, on college campuses. Nor does
it necessarily mean that racial prejudice has not simply been transformed into
more subtle, "ostensibly nonracial" 1 57 sorts of expression of perhaps a "more
insidious type of racial bigotry." 1 58 But "ostensibly nonracial" expressions of
racism are obviously relatively difficult to prosecute or to consistently hold tor-
tious. Not surprisingly, it is only as the practical significance of relatively crude,
objectively racist public speech has diminished that it has become possible to
imagine legal restrictions on such speech becoming sufficiently popular to be
practically workable. The evidence appears to establish that high and increas-
ing percentages of white Americans regard minorities as able and competent 5 9
and prefer less invidious, and even self-accusatory, explanations for the persis-
tence of racial inequality. 160 Contemporary discrimination is as likely to take
the form of whites rating favorably perceived blacks more positively than
favorably perceived whites. 161 However ultimately destructive such forms of
bias may be, it is difficult to imagine a society's pressing its criminal or tort
system beyond concern for discriminatory conduct, whether by omission or com-
mission, to attack the social idea-communicating speech that underlies such forms
of stereotyping.
V. CONCLUSION AND POSTSCRIPT:
DOES THE VIRTUE OF TOLERANCE REQUIRE
TOLERANCE OF RACIAL EPITHET SPEECH?
The argument sketched above has suggested that, while arguably racist
speech seeking to convey some recognizable social idea should generally be
constitutionally protected, speech in the form of racist epithets need not be so
protected, in light of the purposes or values underlying the free speech clause.
The argument has also suggested a particular approach to the question of why
restricting the latter sort of speech is not merely constitutionally permissible,
but sound public policy as well. A number of objections have been anticipated
and discussed above, but no extended reference was made to the well-regarded
157. Pettigrew, supra note 138, at 674.
158. Frey & Gaertner, Helping and the Avoidance of Inappropriate Interracial Behavior: A Strategy That
Perpetuates a Nonprejudiced Self-Image, 50 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1083, 1083 (1986).
159. See Kinder & Sears, supra note 156, at 419 (Among the sample studied, "few thought blacks less
intelligent than whites.").
160. See P. SNIDERMAN, RACE AND INEQUALITY 31 (1985) (About three-fourths of both a national and
a San Francisco Bay area sample of white Americans preferred as an explanation for racial inequality that"generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work
their way out of the lower class.").
161. See Jussim, Coleman & Lerch, The Nature of Stereotypes: A Comparison and Integration of Three
Theories, 52 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 536, 544 (1987).
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and already influential defense of the constitutional protection of extremist speech
developed by Dean Lee Bollinger in his recent book, The Tolerant Society. 162
There is much more in Bollinger's book that is of value, and much more that
is susceptible of plausible criticism, than a brief discussion can suggest. Here
we will attempt no more than to briefly indicate the major theme of the book
and suggest why its implications for the argument sketched above in this Arti-
cle are less significant than might be supposed.
Bollinger's thesis is that many observers have rightly felt that particularly
in certain cases involving extremist speech, such as in the litigation involving
the proposed Nazi parade in Skokie, Illinois, 163 the principle of freedom of
expression has been carried beyond the bounds suggested by the most familiar
explanations for the protection of freedom of expression. "" To satisfactorily
account for why such deeply painful, necessarily unpersuasive speech is pro-
tected, Bollinger suggests that we must recognize that excessive intolerance,
in the realm of speech and elsewhere is a serious, looming threat16 and that
the exercise of voluntary self-restraint involved in permitting extremist speech
to go legally unimpeded is, therefore, healthful in strengthening the public ca-
pacity for the important virtue of tolerance. 166 The particular value of protect-
ing speech as profoundly offensive and inane as that of the Illinois Nazis lies
in recognizing the truth of the character-building maxim, "[to straighten a bent
stick you bend it back the other way."1 67
Recoiling from the impulse to excessive intolerance in the particular con-
text of extremist speech is thus meant to be educative or public character-building,
with benefits accruing far beyond the area of speech itself. Free speech is sin-
gled out for essentially practical reasons as "a discrete and limited context" 6
in which the costs of extraordinary self-restraint may be relatively low and the
benefits relatively high. 169 This argument is, not surprisingly, set forth by Dean
Bollinger with a good deal more subtlety and power than this brief account sug-
gests; but this description may suffice for our limited purposes.
162. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 13. See also Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case'
and Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982) (book review of A. NEIER, DEFENDING My ENE-
MY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979)). For a sample of the gener-
ally appreciative reviews of Bollinger's book, see Blasi, The Teaching Function of the First Amendment,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1987); Rosenfeld, Extremist Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1457 (1987); Strauss, Why Be Tolerant?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1485 (1986). For a sense of some
of the limitations of the liberal political virtue of tolerance itself, see generally R. WOLFF, B. MOORE &
H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE (1969).
163. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978); Village of Skokie
v. National Socialist Party, 69 II. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
164. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 13, at 14-15.
165. See id. at 106-07.
166. See id. at 120-25.
167. Id. at 125.
168. Id. at 121.
169. See id. at 124.
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One might respond to Bollinger's thesis by suggesting that whatever civic
virtues our society may be in acutely short supply of, the sort of tolerance and
self-restraint in the realm of political ideas that Bollinger apotheosizes is not
one of them. Certainly the students Professor Bloom describes in The Closing
of the American Mind1 70 tend more in the direction of an almost vacuous
relativism than toward the tyranny of classic intolerance, at least in the realm
of speech. But even if we assume that our contemporary inclination toward ex-
cessive intolerance is so pronounced that it is worth paying the very real price
that the cultivation of tolerance of extremist speech exacts, it does not follow
that the realm of racial epithet speech is an appropriate venue in which to dis-
play such tolerance. Judicial toleration of racial epithet speech devoid of, or
as distinct from, articulated social ideas is still too readily interpretable, at least
to some, as bespeaking not the virtue of tolerance, but continuing unconscious
judicial indifference and insensitivity to the sensibilities of historically subor-
dinated groups.
Ultimately, however, any excessive social intolerance we detect may simply
not be attributable to excessive judicial intolerance of racial epithet speech or
of extremist speech generally. It may well be that whatever pedagogical benefits
that can be drawn from the technique Bollinger recommends are already being
extracted. There is certainly no logical necessity that civic tolerance be enhanced
particularly through the vehicle of restraint in even the broad area of speech. 171
There is arguably a surfeit of voluntary, quasi-principled judicial self-restraint,
as the agent of the broader society, in other areas of the law, such as criminal
sentencing. It can reasonably be argued that the sentences ordinarily actually
served for violent crimes are not rationally explainable on any established
theory of criminal sentencing, apart from sheer, gratuitous self-restraint on the
part of society. For a variety of reasons, then, Bollinger's argument does not
establish the inadvisability of legal restraints on racial epithet speech.
170. See A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 25-43 (1987).
171. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 13, at 121-24.
172. See R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 182 (1973) (citing a figure of median time
to parole of 45 months for first degree robbers).
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